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The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s military action in the Donbas in 2014 have revealed 
a major potential for a revival of nationalist sentiments in Russian society. The wave of ‘patriotic’ 
attitudes that swept through the country back then has enabled the government to co-opt 
the rhetoric that is typical of nationalist groups. The Kremlin has used this period to shore up 
its legitimacy among the public and step up control of specific organisations. This has resulted 
in changes to the structure of the nationalist movement. A weakening was recorded mainly 
in relation to nationalist organisations that are independent from the government and those 
organisations which had been involved in the fighting in the Donbas in the initial stage of 
Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
For the Kremlin, nationalist ideology and nationalist organisations that are unable to act in-
dependently are a handy political instrument. They are mainly being used to build support for 
the government and to consolidate power in Russia. At the same time, the fear that independ-
ent nationalist movements may become empowered and organisations that are dependent 
on the authorities may become emancipated poses a potential threat to the country’s internal 
stability. This makes the Kremlin strive for greater control of those nationalist groups that still 
remain somewhat independent. 
Nationalist organisations
In ideological terms, aside from features typi-
cal of nationalist movements, including placing 
emphasis on national identity, viewing the need 
to defend national interests as the most promi-
nent task of the state and elevating such inter-
ests above those of the individual, most Russian 
nationalist organisations are characterised by 
imperialist tendencies and in particular by the 
conviction that it is crucial to maintain and even 
expand Russia’s zone of influence. According to 
the ideology which these organisations support, 
two main lines of Russian nationalism can be 
identified: the imperial line and the ethnocentric 
line1. Organisations belonging to the first line 
include monarchist movements and organisa-
tions associated with the Orthodox Church, or-
ganisations that subscribe to the idea of uniting 
the areas of the former Russian Empire, those 
that support anti-Western attitudes, paramili-
tary organisations, and organisations dealing 
with historical politics. The ethnocentric line, for 
its part, is represented by groups that support 
anti-immigrant policy and promote the suprem-
acy of ethnic Russians over other members of 
society. The division into two lines is a certain 
simplification. In practice, nationalist groups 
1 See Katarzyna Chawryło, Russian nationalists on the 
Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, OSW Commentary, 29 De-
cember 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
osw-commentary/2014-12-29/russian-nationalists-krem-
lins-policy-ukraine
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active in Russia are strongly fragmented and 
non-homogeneous in terms of the views they 
promote and the form of their organisation (a 
large number of these organisations remain of-
ficially unregistered). Aside from the main char-
acteristic of the nationalist movement in Russia, 
i.e. the fact of subscribing to specific ideological 
lines, such divisions also reflect specific organ-
isations’ degree of dependence on the govern-
ment and their attitude towards the Kremlin’s 
policy (in particular their attitude towards the 
war in Ukraine).
In 2011–2015, the most prominent organisa-
tion under the ethnocentric line of nationalism 
was “the Russians” (Русские or Russkiye), which 
supported the plan to transform Russia into an 
ethnically unified state and stemmed from the 
former Movement Against Illegal Immigration, 
which had been dissolved some time ago. In 
2015, a court in Moscow considered “the Rus-
sians” an extremist organisation, which resulted 
in its dissolution. At the same time, the polit-
ical activity of all three leaders of this move-
ment has been hampered or prevented: Alek-
sandr Belov and Dmitri Dyomushkin are serving 
prison sentences and Vladimir Basmanov is in 
exile. Numerous other smaller organisations 
have sprung up from this group. In their quest 
to recruit new members, they compete with 
each other to a certain degree. These organisa-
tions are subject to relatively strict controls by 
the government and are generally not granted 
permission to organise legal public gatherings. 
Therefore, in their activities they focus on or-
ganising minor scale events such as lectures, de-
bates, expeditions, tours and training sessions.
Vyacheslav Maltsev, politician and blogger, has 
recently become a prominent figure in a nation-
alist movement which is in opposition to the 
Kremlin. He is the author of the political chan-
nel “Artpodgotovka” on YouTube, which has 
gained popularity and gathered a group of new 
activists including individuals active in the unof-
ficial “New Opposition” movement (Mark Galp-
erin, Ivan Beletski, Denis Romanov, Yuri Gorski). 
To avoid being tried for extremism, Maltsev left 
Russia, which will hinder him from maintaining 
his popularity among nationalist groups. 
A major portion of organisations that belong 
to the ethnocentric line of nationalism remains 
in opposition to the Kremlin. The ideological 
spectrum of these movements is very broad, 
and some of them, regardless of their dislike 
of the Kremlin, actively support Russia’s activity 
in Ukraine. These organisations include radical 
nationalist and right-wing movements such as 
the neo-Nazi organisation, Restrukt, and cer-
tain groups centred around moderate national-
ists, such as the movement centred around the 
Sputnik i Pogrom website, which emphasises 
ethnicity-related issues and supports imperial 
and anti-Western rhethoric (the government 
has recently blocked access to this website). Or-
ganisations hostile towards the Kremlin which 
nonetheless support Russia’s involvement in the 
Donbas include the group centred around the 
nationalist Bolshevik party, The Other Russia (the 
so-called “natsbols” or нацбол), established by 
eccentric writer Eduard Limonov. Although this 
group used to be one of the most active nation-
alist movements in opposition to the Kremlin, at 
present it has reached an impasse. 
A major portion of organisations that belong 
to the imperial line of nationalism support the 
policy pursued by the government. Usually, 
these groups are financially dependent on the 
Kremlin, they are allowed to function unimped-
ed as long as there is demand for their activi-
ty on the part of the state administration. One 
example of an organisation whose main task is 
to combat opposition groups, channel radical 
right sentiment using nationalist rhetoric and 
manifest support for the government, is the 
Anti-Maidan movement established in 2015. 
A large number of organisations that fall 
within the ethnocentric line of nationalism 
remain in opposition to the Kremlin.
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Its leaders include individuals loyal to the Krem-
lin – Aleksandr Zaldostanov (also known as The 
Surgeon), the leader of the nationalist motorcy-
cle club Night Wolves, and Dmitry Sablin, mem-
ber of the Federation Council, one of the lead-
ers of the Battle Brotherhood, an organisation 
that groups war veterans and retired soldiers. 
The organisation Night Wolves, a component 
of the Anti-Maidan movement, enjoys person-
al support from Vladimir Putin that he demon-
strates publicly. Each year it receives significant 
funds under the state subsidy system. Other or-
ganisations making up the Anti-Maidan move-
ment include the National Liberation Move-
ment (NOD), which supports imperialist and 
anti-American rhethoric and at present seems 
to be the most active organisation supporting 
Russia’s policy towards Ukraine and organis-
ing provocative actions targeting opposition 
groups. This organisation’s very close ties with 
the Kremlin can, for instance, be confirmed by 
the fact that its members ran in the most recent 
elections as candidates put forward by Russia’s 
ruling party (Yevgeniy Fyodorov was included 
on United Russia’s candidate list). 
The imperial line of nationalist movements also 
comprises organisations which are strongly 
pro-Kremlin in their views but are managed by 
the government in an undisclosed manner. One 
of these organisations is the Eurasian Youth 
Association, which emphasises Russia’s civili-
zational uniqueness and supports the plan to 
boost integration with the post-Soviet area and 
with China. The organisation’s creator and ide-
ologist is Aleksandr Dugin, who responds to 
certain demands for propaganda on the part of 
the government in that he challenges liberal ide-
as and promotes militarism and the concept of 
Russia’s supremacy over the so-called Eurasian 
area. Organisations associated with the Ortho-
dox Church and monarchist organisations, such 
as the Black Hundreds and the Association of 
Orthodox Warrant Officers, also have close ties 
with the government. The imperial line of na-
tionalism is also represented by several organi-
sations that receive official government approv-
al. They include the Liberal-Democratic Party of 
Russia (a populist party having its representa-
tives in the Duma), headed by Vladimir Zhiri-
novsky, and the nationalist-conservative Rodina 
party, currently headed by Alexei Zhuravlov (its 
former leader was Dmitri Rogozin, a politician 
known for his nationalist views and current 
deputy prime minister).
In the period of the ‘Russian Spring’ (pro-Rus-
sian riots and demonstrations in south-east-
ern Ukraine in 2014), nationalistically oriented 
volunteers ready to take part in the fighting 
in Ukraine began to form their own organisa-
tional structures. The most prominent figure 
of this part of the nationalist movement is Igor 
Girkin (also known as Strelkov), former leader 
of pro-Russian separatists and retired Russian 
intelligence colonel. He created the Novorossi-
ya movement that supported the plan to create 
a separate independent state in the Donbas. 
In the period of intense fighting, the Russian Im-
perial Movement was particularly active among 
organisations loyal to the Kremlin. At that time 
it was involved in training militants and send-
ing them to the Donbas, whereas at present it 
deals with national-military education of young 
people2. At present, volunteers returning from 
the Donbas are welcomed by many national-
ist organisations as new members. However, 
most of these organisations have neither an at-
tractive offer for these individuals nor support 
from the Kremlin. 
2 ht tps : / / w w w.wash ing tonp os t . com / wor ld /e u -
rope/a-right-wing-militia-trains-russians-to-fight-
the-next-war--with-or-without-putin/2017/01/02/
f06b5ce8-b71e-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.htm-
l?utm_term=.4673b709b849
Football fans represent a unique group as-
sociated with nationalist circles. From the 
Kremlin’s point of view, they are a potential 
tool to be used in provocations.
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Football fans are a unique group associated 
with nationalist circles. They are characterised 
by very aggressive rhetoric and a readiness to 
use violence. Despite the fact that frequently 
they are members of various nationalist groups, 
they have their own organisational structures 
comprising football fans specifically. From the 
Kremlin’s point of view, they form a poten-
tial tool to be used in provocations, but they 
also pose a threat connected with their violent 
methods. At present, Russian football fans are 
among the world’s most aggressive groups of 
this type. They have repeatedly been involved 
in riots organised during football tournaments 
abroad in which Russia’s team took part. 
Nationalism and xenophobia 
in Russian society
Despite the fact that in recent years the sta-
tus of nationalist groups has declined, Russian 
society continues to be characterised by a rel-
atively high degree of support for nationalist 
views. According to research conducted by the 
Levada Centre in August 2016, as many as 52% 
of Russians approve of the slogan “Russia for 
Russians”3. However, it should be noted that 
this mood does change to reflect specific events 
and the intensity of the nationalist narrative in 
state propaganda. Due to frequent appearanc-
es of celebrities and opinion-forming journalists 
supporting nationalist views (including Dmitri 
Kiselov, Maksim Shevchenko, Aleksandr Dugin) 
in media controlled by the Kremlin, nationalist 
ideology has made its way to the centre of po-
litical discourse. In this context, to challenge the 
idea that the nation, understood as a perceived 
cultural and political community, is the highest 
value in the public realm, is seen as a violation 
of the unofficial consensus and a move away 
from political correctness. 
3 http://www.levada.ru/2016/10/11/intolerantnost-i-ksen-
ofobiya/
The level of xenophobia in Russian society also 
continues to be high – almost 60% of Russians 
report a dislike of other nationalities4. Russians 
clearly support a strict policy of curbing im-
migration – 70% of the population surveyed 
approved of the plan to limit the flow of rep-
resentatives of other nationalities to Russia5. 
Russians particularly dislike migrants from the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, which is where the 
biggest proportion of migrant workers comes 
from. Regardless of the drop in the scale of 
immigration to Russia recorded over the last 
two years, Russians believe that the number of 
immigrants in their immediate surroundings is 
on the rise. The research has also shown that 
the majority of the individuals surveyed claim 
that immigrants destroy Russian culture, have 
a negative impact on the economy, contribute 
to an increase in the crime rate and take jobs 
away from ethnic Russians. Only a relative-
ly small group of respondents (20%) opposes 
the plan to introduce limitations for any of the 
nationalities. Such beliefs have been of key im-
portance for the popularity of those Russian 
nationalist movements that supported the plan 
to create an institutional framework to guaran-
tee the supremacy of ethnic Russians over other 
nationalities. However, the support for radical 
nationalist groups enjoining their followers to 
use violence is much lower. It is noteworthy that 
there is a negative correlation between the atti-
tude towards migrants from the Caucasus and 
the attitude towards the United States which is 
traditionally seen as hostile. In periods in which 
Russians expressed more hostile attitudes to-
wards the United States, their attitudes towards 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid.
The level of xenophobia in Russian socie-
ty also continues to be high – almost 60% 
of Russians report a dislike of other nation-
alities.
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the residents of North Caucasus were more pos-
itive. This relation indicated that there is a need 
within society to seek an enemy and that this 
need is being boosted by state propaganda ac-
cording to its current demand.
The year 2013 saw a culmination of national-
ist and xenophobic attitudes6. This was due 
to the rising number of economic migrants 
in Russia and the lack of mechanisms for in-
tegrating them, as well as the fact that back 
then this sentiment was being boosted by the 
state propaganda machine across all-Russian 
TV channels. Manifestations of aggressive na-
tionalist mobilisation within society included 
the ethnically-motivated riots that happened in 
Moscow’s suburban Biryulevo district in 2013. 
Over the last three years, anti-immigrant feelings 
and inter-ethnic tensions have eased. This is due to 
a drop in the number of economic migrants and 
to the fact that the propaganda machine has 
been reoriented towards the conflict with the 
West. State propaganda outlets have begun to 
create a narrative that the West poses a threat 
to Russians and that it has a ‘Russophobic’ ori-
entation. As a consequence, anti-immigrant 
rhethoric began to lose ground. Formerly, they 
were an area in which nationalist groups dis-
tanced themselves from the Kremlin.
The number of participants in the so-called Rus-
sian Marches organised each year since 2005 in 
Russia’s biggest cities can be viewed as a touch-
stone of the power of nationalist movements. 
These demonstrations, which are independent 
from the government, showed their greatest 
potential in 2010–2013, when they were at-
tended in Moscow by up to 6 000 individuals. 
Most of the participants were radically-inclined 
6 http://www.levada.ru/2015/08/25/ksenofobiya-i-nat-
sionalizm/
nationalist-oriented youths. The number of par-
ticipants in the Russian Marches did not rise 
any further and from the beginning of 2013 it 
began to decrease. This was partly due to the 
effectiveness of administrative barriers created 
by the government and partly to the reorienta-
tion of social mobilisation to rhethoric empha-
sising the power of the state and the interna-
tional threat. The period of the ‘Russian Spring’, 
followed by Russia’s military activity in Crimea 
and in the Donbas, has triggered an elevated 
patriotic mood within Russian society and re-
vived the nationalists’ hopes. However, the 
mobilisation organised after the annexation of 
Crimea has diverted the attention of the general 
public from immigration-related issues, which 
are of key importance for the Russian national-
ist movement, and caused a slackening in the 
nationalist movement itself. The proportion of 
individuals expressing dislike of immigrants de-
clined (for example, the proportion of people 
experiencing dislike, fear and irritation towards 
migrants from southern republics fell from 
61% in November 2013 to 42% in June 2014), 
which can be interpreted as a consequence of 
the drop in immigration to Russia caused by 
the economic crisis and the increasingly less fa-
vourable exchange rate of the rouble, as well as 
society’s mobilisation in connection with the 
military conflicts waged by Russia. This places 
the movements which consolidate their sup-
porter base using the ethno-nationalist narra-
tive in a difficult situation.
The Kremlin’s attitude 
towards nationalists
The Kremlin uses the nationalists it ‘manages’ 
as a tool to consolidate society and boost sup-
port for the government. Despite the fact that 
in recent months the activity of pro-Kremlin 
nationalist organisations has weakened, the 
government continues to strive to channel the 
actions of nationalist groups within the struc-
tures it controls. The form and the degree of 
The Kremlin uses the nationalists it ‘man-
ages’ as a tool for consolidating society 
and boosting support for the government.
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governmental control of nationalists vary: from 
creating nationalist organisations and ‘manual 
steering’ thereof (the NOD organisation is one 
example), through supporting these organisa-
tions (for example, most organisations associ-
ated with the Orthodox Church and the Night 
Wolves), to infiltrating them and bringing about 
their disintegration (this happened, for exam-
ple, to the ‘natsbol’ groups and “the Russians”). 
In recent years, nationalist organisations con-
trolled by the government have less frequently 
been used as tools in domestic politics, where 
they formerly served as instruments for com-
batting political opponents and demonstrating 
support for the Kremlin. They are still being 
used in foreign policy, under which Moscow 
is pursuing the tactic involving offering sup-
port to radical and populist movements in 
other countries. One example of such actions 
from the soft power repertoire was the Interna-
tional Conservative Forum organised in March 
2015 in St. Petersburg by the nationalist Rodina 
party, attended by extreme right-wing organi-
sations from Europe. Abroad, Moscow is win-
ning over supporters in the form of radical right 
groups that potentially serve as a means of put-
ting pressure on Western societies, mainly by 
criticising the United States, which is seen as 
a symbol of liberal democracy and globalisation, 
and by emphasising Russia’s moral supremacy. 
The Kremlin is trying to maintain a network of 
pro-regime organisations and is creating mech-
anisms of financial and organisational support 
for them. Each year, patriotically-oriented, 
Orthodox and nationalist organisations receive 
a major chunk of state subsidies for non-gov-
ernmental organisations, as well as funds from 
oligarchs and businesspeople associated with 
the government. This group includes Vladimir 
Yakunin, who funds Russian influence networks 
in Europe and ‘patriotic’ initiatives in Russia, 
and Konstantin Malofeyev, accused of spon-
soring the units fighting in the Donbas, among 
other things.
The government is aware of the risk involved 
in supporting the nationalists, it fears that they 
may become emancipated and that new forms 
of spontaneous and independent social activi-
ty may emerge in Russia. Therefore, it is trying 
to control Russian nationalist groups and avoid 
making overt statements regarding ethnic dif-
ferences, fearing that these views – which re-
main popular with Russians – may pose a threat 
to the state’s stability. The Kremlin is gradual-
ly trying to neutralise independent nationalist 
groups. These actions became notably strong-
er in the second half of 2014, when the gov-
ernment used a series of measures to subdue 
the so-called Russian March. Several individuals 
were arrested, including Aleksandr Belov, one 
of the event’s organisers, who openly criticised 
the ‘Russian Spring’. On the day of the march, 
a major demonstration was organised to express 
support for the government. Other manifesta-
tions of the system’s increasingly repressive na-
ture towards independent nationalists included 
the arrest of Dmitri Dyomushkin, another leader 
of this movement, in April 2015 (in April 2017 
he was sentenced to 2.5 years’ imprisonment). 
Attempts by the Kremlin to control and neutral-
ise the radical factions of the nationalist move-
ment have largely proved successful: most in-
dependent organisations are in deep crisis and 
pose no threat to Russia’s political stability. This 
is also evident in the declining number of par-
ticipants in the Russian Marches – it diminishes 
with each year.
The Kremlin is trying to prevent the possible re-
vival of nationalist groups that are in opposition 
to the government and which emphasise ethnic 
issues in their discourse. Attempts to quell this 
point of view can be confirmed, for instance, by 
the fact that the state media almost completely 
ignored the case of the killing of a four-year-
Abroad, Moscow is winning over support-
ers in the form of radical right groups, 
mainly by criticising the United States.
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old girl by her carer from Uzbekistan in February 
20167. Rapprochement between nationalists 
and opposition groups with a different (non-na-
tionalist) orientation is also seen as a potential 
threat to the government. This is why the gov-
ernment became concerned about the increas-
ing popularity of Alexei Navalny, an opposition 
politician known for his nationalist views, and 
about the cooperation between liberal groups 
and nationalists centred around Vyacheslav 
Maltsev. Since the spring of 2017, the govern-
ment has taken measures to break up the group 
centred around Vyacheslav Maltsev – Yuri Gorski, 
his collaborator, was arrested (he escaped from 
house arrest and at present is in exile), and 
Maltsev himself was charged with involvement 
in extremist activities, as a result of which he 
too fled abroad. The ruling elite fears that mass 
protests resembling those organised in Decem-
ber 2011 may take place again. Back then, anti- 
-Kremlin rallies held on Bolotnaya Square were 
guarded by units composed of members of the 
independent nationalist movement.
One of the tools for controlling nationalist or-
ganisations is constituted by the legal measures 
preventing extremism. Reports compiled by the 
SOVA Center for Information and Analysis that 
monitors the situation of nationalist groups in 
Russia, suggest that in 2015 there was an in-
crease in the number of individuals sentenced 
for extremist activities not covered by other pro-
visions of the penal code (i.e. activities that do 
not involve violence)8. This type of control on 
the part of the government is facilitated by the 
fact that the leaders of independent nationalist 
movements in Russia seldom change and the 
state of the organisations themselves depends 
on the attitude and activity of their leaders.
7 Some media informed about an instruction from the 
Kremlin demanding that the case of the killing be omitted, 
http://www.rbc.ru/technology_and_media/01/03/2016/ 
56d48e289a79477f2af24d82
8 In September 2015, 26 individuals served their sentenc-
es for political and propaganda-related activities and 
around 30 individuals for membership of banned organ-
isations (however, these were mainly radical Islamists), 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2015/09/22/ 
609638-tyurma-za-slovo 
Alongside the shifts in the Kremlin’s narrative 
regarding the conflict in Ukraine (abandoning 
the plan to include the Donbas in the Russian 
Federation and to create a separate state or-
ganism there called Novorossiya), the role of 
nationalist movement activists in the conflict 
with Ukraine weakened, which also reduced 
their hopes regarding Kremlin policy. After the 
‘Russian Spring’, most nationalist organisations 
independent of the Kremlin have been in crisis – 
their membership and activity have decreased. 
These organisations lost their distinctiveness 
when, in the period of the ‘Russian Spring’, 
a large segment of them toned down their crit-
icism of the government. It is noteworthy that 
on the day that the Federation Council issued 
its consent to deploy and use Russian troops 
abroad, leaders of several nationalist organisa-
tions (including “the Russians”, which was in-
dependent from the government) announced 
that they would defend Russians in Ukraine and 
other parts of the world9. Several organisations 
have reached a deadlock – these are mainly the 
radical organisations that supported the ‘Rus-
sian Spring’ and opted for recognising Novor-
ossiya as an independent state organism to be 
created on the basis of separatist republics in 
south-eastern Ukraine. Most of these organisa-
tions are in favour of reviving the plan to cre-
ate Novorossiya or include the Donbas in the 
Russian Federation. Some continue to be in-
volved in a support initiative for Donbas sep-
aratists (for instance, they organise so-called 
humanitarian aid convoys). The involvement 
of nationalist groups in the war in Ukraine is 
much smaller than in 2014. Should this change, 
it will not be down to efforts by specific organi-
sations but as a result of a shift in the Kremlin’s 
political strategy.
9 https: //www.gazeta.ru/politics /news/2014/03/01/ 
n_5985181.shtml
Nationalist attitudes within society are 
deep-rooted and enduring.
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Prospects
Nationalist attitudes within society are deep-root-
ed and persistent. In the future, nationalist sen-
timents and ethnically-motivated tensions are 
likely to rise if the economic crisis lessens and 
economic migrants from post-Soviet states re-
turn to Russia, which remains their primary for-
eign destination for work purposes. If this is the 
case, the crime rate may rise and ethnically-mo-
tivated clashes may be organised (such clashes 
happen regularly in marketplaces in Moscow and 
other big cities). The questions of migration and 
nationality policy, which are hot topics in Rus-
sian politics, are likely to be discussed both by 
the government and by the Kremlin’s opponents 
in the campaign ahead of the 2018 presidential 
election. In the long-term perspective, any drop 
in the government’s approval rating or a sudden 
internal crisis will likely increase the risk that the 
Kremlin may look for social support by making 
increasingly strong references to nationalist ide-
as and by confronting external enemies.
For the Kremlin, nationalist organisations that 
are loyal to the government and are ‘managed’ 
by it will form a convenient tool for shaping the 
public mood. This is why they will be held in re-
serve for deployment as and when required, re-
gardless of how insignificant their activities are. 
It is very likely that they will be used by Russian 
services to escalate tensions in those parts of the 
world that are of key importance for Russia, due 
to these organisations’ ties with radical organisa-
tions abroad. The crisis of independent national-
ist groups that stand in opposition to the Kremlin 
is likely to continue. Their prospects of prevailing 
in the contest with pro-regime organisations and 
the media, for playing the role of advocates of 
nationalist views and serving as a mouthpiece 
of public opinion, remain negligible. Similarly, it 
is unlikely that in the short-term perspective the 
nationalist mood within Russian society, which 
has recently shunned political involvement, will 
translate into active participation in independent 
nationalist movements. Due to the fact that their 
resources are considerably smaller, reconstruc-
tion of the independent organisations’ capabil-
ities is unlikely.
